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SINGLE-ENGINE FIREFIGHTING AIR TANKER HUMAN FACTORS
R. Small, C. Wickens, A. Sebok, R. Sargent
Alion Science and Technology Corporation
Boulder, Colorado USA
M. Bickham
Boise, Idaho USA
C. Kemper
Queen Bee Air Specialties
Rigby, Idaho USA
This paper describes the unique environment and safety challenges for pilots who fly singleengine air tanker (SEAT) firefighting aircraft, and the highlights from a human factors (HF)
analysis of SEAT operations conducted in 2009. The HF analysis used the FAA’s Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) because of its broad examination of HF issues and
prior use in aviation. We examined operations, training, and the applicable safety reports, and we
interviewed or received anonymous surveys from 71 stakeholders – pilots, supervisors, and
managers. The analysis yielded 63 recommendations, many of which were adopted for the 2010
fire season. Despite a busier fire season in 2010 compared with 2009, SEAT safety improved.
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) attributes this improvement, in part, to the adopted
recommendations.
From 1997-2007 the single-engine air tanker (SEAT) accident rate was three times higher than the general
aviation (GA) accident rate in the U.S. (BLM, 2009; NTSB, 2009). While the SEAT firefighting mission is
inherently more challenging than typical GA flights, the BLM, the agency responsible for the SEAT program,
determined that the predominant contributing factor for the SEAT program’s poor safety record was human factors
(BLM, 2009).
Unique Environment
The majority of SEAT firefighting aircraft are AT-802s, a turbo-prop aircraft designed for crop-dusting
(Figure 1). Because aerial firefighting is predominantly a summer activity, many SEAT pilots earn their living
during the rest of the year in agricultural operations. Agricultural operations are typically flown in the early
morning with light or no winds, over flat terrain, with little or no radio communications, and few, if any, other
aircraft in the vicinity. Agricultural operations and training are fairly unstructured under FAR Part-137.

Figure 1. Air Tractor AT-802 SEAT aircraft, a turbo-prop designed for dropping chemicals from low altitudes.
In contrast, SEAT firefighting operations are often flown in the afternoons over rugged terrain (e.g.,
mountainous with trees), with variable winds due to the local effects from growing fires, and with extensive radio
communications. Radio calls are with a dispatch agency, aerial supervision, and sometimes other aircraft in the fire
traffic area, including helicopters. Another important distinction is that crop-dusting is most effective when
chemicals are applied as low to the crops as practical; whereas with fire retardant, the ideal drop height is 85 feet,
plus or minus 5 feet, above the foliage. SEAT training and operations follow FAR Part-135 which provides more
structure, including simulator training (starting in 2011; Figure 2), and operations and training manuals for pilots
and maintainers. Firefighting pilot tasks and responsibilities, therefore, are significantly different from crop-dusting
tasks.

Figure 2. AT-802 prototypical cockpit simulator to be used for more rigorous initial and recurrent pilot training.
Methods
We began the analysis by reviewing some SEAT background information, NTSB SEAT accident reports,
and with the desire to cast as wide a net as practical to understand the SEAT firefighting environment and
contributing factors to the poor safety record. We decided to use HFACS because it not only prompts analysts to
study pilot issues, but also supervisory and organizational issues (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). For example, in
the “unsafe acts” category, we examined pilot skill-based errors, decision errors, perception errors, and violations.
Preconditions for these unsafe acts included adverse mental states, adverse physiological states, limitations, and
personal readiness. Supervisory issues that impact safety included inadequate supervision, inappropriate operations,
failure to correct known problems, and supervisory violations. And, finally, organizational issues that contribute to
safety problems are resource management, organizational climate, organizational processes, and poor oversight.
We also thought that a survey, with the promise of confidentiality, would enable us to receive inputs from
as many stakeholders as practical. The BLM customers supported this goal by providing a cover letter that promised
confidentiality.
After reading SEAT program documents (e.g., operations guides, training materials, vendor contracts), we
attended SEAT pilot training which clearly illustrated the many challenges faced by pilots. During the training
program, we also interviewed stakeholders and distributed our survey. After training, we visited SEAT bases to
observe operations, conduct interviews, and distribute more surveys. We obtained a video of actual firefighting
operations, with radio calls, which further illuminated the operational tempo and numerous opportunities for errors
and distractions.
Another key step in our method was to analyze accident, incident and safety reports from the SEAT
program safety database. This information gave us a historical perspective, since our personal observations were
limited to a single fire season (2009). We used HFACS to categorize these reports. For more details about our
methods, and the results and recommendations, below, interested readers should see Small et al. (2009).
Results
Results from background reading indicated the complexity of aerial firefighting operations. Training and
SEAT base observations reinforced these results. On the one hand, the AT-802 is well-suited to the role of initial
attack on a wildfire because of its range from bases located in fire-prone areas, and because of its ability to
efficiently carry a load of fire retardant. It can be dispatched quickly to keep fires from growing, and it affords the
pilot good visibility from a crash-worthy (9 g) cockpit.
On the other hand, a single-pilot aircraft precludes crew coordination and sharing responsibilities for
cockpit tasks when operations, including radio calls, become complex. Also, the AT-802 is highly maneuverable
and has a high-torque engine which puts it closer to its flight envelope limits than other firefighting aircraft (AMD,
2009). Plus, the drop gate and radio controls are both fairly complex (Figure 3). For pilots with only agricultural
experiences, the radio panel presents a big challenge.

Figure 3. Typical AT-802 drop gate control panel (left) and radio control panel (right). While most SEAT pilots
are already familiar with the drop gate controls due to their crop-dusting experiences, few have experience with the
radio controls until they begin firefighting training.
Results from surveys and interviews indicated that the Top Three hazards were: (1) weather & visibility;
(2) terrain (unfamiliar, mountainous, or low-level flight over it); and (3) long periods of no operations followed by
high activity. The survey also asked about flying distractions, which focused our attention on: radio
communications and the difficult radio panel interface, other traffic in the fire area (e.g., helicopters dropping water
on the fire), and diversions to other fires or bases. We also noted that safety is emphasized in different ways by the
various companies who provide SEAT services. In particular, some companies pressure pilots to fly against a fire in
marginal conditions because operational flights are how the companies earn more money under their BLM contracts.
The survey results revealed that training, operational support and procedural safeguards are sufficient and
effective. Also, maintenance and aircraft reliability were not identified as problems, even though some safety
reports indicated otherwise. This disparity was likely due to the timing of the safety reports from years past
compared to the more current information gathered from interviews and surveys. In the prior four years, before our
analysis began, older aircraft were retired in favor of the newer AT-802.
Results from the safety report database analysis included a total of 19 reports from NTSB and federal
SEAT accident and incident summaries (1996-2009). In these 19 accidents or incidents, there were 5 fatalities.
Table 1 lists the probable causes for these 19 SEAT accidents and indicates that engine failures and controlled flight
into terrain (CFIT) are the primary causes of accidents, responsible for 80% of fatalities and for 68% of the
accidents. It is unclear whether the engine failures were due to maintenance or pilot performance issues. CFIT
accidents are distinguished from loss of control in flight (LOCIF) accidents, so the CFIT accidents reported here are
inferred to be due to loss of pilot situation awareness. Similarly, failure to see obstructions is also related to pilot
situation awareness deficiencies. Therefore, we may conclude that 80% of fatalities and 42% of accidents resulted
from a loss of situation awareness, which may be due, in part, to the distractions mentioned above.
Further analysis of the 19 reports by phase of flight indicates that the fire retardant dropping phase is
associated with the most accidents (63%) and fatalities (80%). Within this phase, accidents and incidents are evenly
distributed among approach to drop, drop, and climb after drop.
Table 2 identifies the HFACS category for the 19 accidents and incidents. Some accidents involved
multiple categories and subcategories, so that the total number of accidents and incidents for a given category does
not equal the sum of the subcategories. This table indicates that deficiencies were identified across the SEAT
system: pilots, supervisors, and the SEAT organization all contributed to these 19 SEAT accidents and incidents.

Table 1.
Summary of accident and incident reports (1996-2009).
Probable Cause
Number of accidents
Engine failure, loss of power, or throttle failure
71
Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)
63
Failure to see obstruction (dead trees, wires)
21
Loss of control or stall
10
Blown tire
10
Environmental conditions
10
Overweight
10

Fatalities

Table 2.
HFACS categories and subcategories for the 19 accidents & incidents.
HFACS Categories
Number of accidents or incidents
with these factors identified
Unsafe acts
12
Er
rors
9
Vio
lations
7
Preconditions for unsafe acts
8
Substandard conditions of pilots
6
Substandard practices of pilots
5
Unsafe supervision
9
I
nadequate supervision
4
Planned inappropriate operations
5
Failed to correct problem
8
Su
pervisory violations
3
Organizational influences
10
R
esource management
2
Or
ganizational climate
2
Or
ganizational processes
7
Summarizing all results from our data gathering and analysis methods, the top 12 SEAT safety problems
that we identified, in order, are below. To achieve this ordering, we used five main sources: survey responses
(weighted most heavily), interview notes, our personal observations, safety reports, and the video of actual
operations. We noted frequencies of problems and severity. We placed more weight on survey responses due to the
relatively high response rate (N=48) and the high correlation between the number of times a specific hazard was
mentioned and its order in the Top Three list. We assume that anonymous respondents did not collaborate on their
responses, so the survey’s results were, in a sense, self-validating.
1. Weather, visibility (e.g., winds over rugged terrain, smoke)
2. Terrain awareness, CFIT (controlled flight into the terrain)
3. Pilot skills, CTM (cockpit task management)
4. Energy management, engine failure, loss of power, LOCIF (loss of control in flight)
5. Air traffic
6. Safety culture
7. Radio chatter (i.e., radio communications not directly relevant to the SEAT pilot)
8. Difficult radio interface (Figure 2)
9. Poor communications (e.g., unclear drop location description from the incident commander)
10. Workload transition (prolonged period of no flying, then significant operations)
11. Cowboy mentality (risky pilot behaviors)
12. Maintenance

Recommendation Highlights
While our initial sense was that in such a dangerous business the accident rate might be higher, we learned
that many accidents and incidents were preventable, and that there are hazards that can and should be addressed as
resources and a consensus to act dictate. We strongly supported the BLM’s decision to transition the SEAT program
from an FAR Part-97 operation to one that follows Part-135 as much as practical – a transition that provides more
structure for training and evaluating pilots and maintainers due to the requirement for formal operations, training,
and maintenance manuals. Our recommendations focused on the categories of personnel selection and training,
cockpit equipment and procedures, communication impediments, maintenance, and organizational issues. Table 3
highlights our recommendations; its third column indicates which of the 12 SEAT safety problems (above) are
addressed by the recommendation category. The recommendations are ordered by the number of higher ranking
problems addressed and the relative ease (lower cost or lower effort) for adopting a recommendation.
Table 3.
Recommendation categories, description, and safety problems addressed.
Recommendation
Category
Brief description of recommendation category
Identify and use screening tools to ensure that SEAT pilots (and other
Personnel selection SEAT personnel, e.g., SEAT managers) have the necessary skills and
personality characteristics.
Targeted training can be developed to address a wide variety of issues,
including: energy management; allocating attention (e.g., visual scan
patterns) to maintain awareness of the terrain, surrounding aircraft and
Training
obstructions; practicing radio procedures; handling sudden workload
transitions; adopting a safety- and procedure-conscious attitude; and
refining piloting skills.
Select equipment to support improved SEAT operations. Examples of
equipment include: radios with improved user interfaces for easier
Cockpit equipment interaction; an angle of attack display for energy management; a
modified TCAS to increase awareness of surrounding traffic; and, a
and procedures
geographic display with interaction capabilities to be used by pilots
and incident commanders (to facilitate shared situation awareness).
Improve radio communications protocol and procedures. Train SEAT
personnel (dispatchers, pilots, incident commanders) on improvements
Communication
that should provide a consistent, efficient and minimalist way of
protocol and
transmitting information. Minimize dispatch calls when automatic
procedures
flight following (AFF) is working properly.
Develop and implement more stringent maintenance inspection
procedures to ensure that all vendors are using the proper equipment
and performing preventative maintenance as needed (on aircraft and
support vehicles) in accordance with FARs and DoT regulations.
Improved
Adopting applicable portions of FAR Part-135 should help here. For
maintenance
incidents and accidents resulting from maintenance errors, perform
procedures
more detailed HFACS-type analyses to obtain more specific
maintenance-related contributing factors to the error (e.g.,
documentation, supervision, lack of available equipment, etc.).
Implement and enforce rules that target key safety violations (e.g.,
Consistent rule
flying below 60’ AGL except for takeoffs and landings) with severe
enforcement
penalties. Consistency and due process are important, too.
Encourage the use of safety reports and do not use them to punish
offenders, except for willful or egregious violations. Include safety
No-blame safety
discussions (especially of recent accidents or incidents) in all training,
culture
briefings, and debriefings; reward safe behaviors.

Problems
addressed
3,6,11

1-11

1,2,3,4,5,8,9

7,9

6, 12

6, 11

2-12

Conclusion
The BLM adopted several of our recommendations for the 2010 fire season, including: more thorough and
formal mission pre-briefings and debriefings; video-taping proper approach-to-drop, drop, and post-drop maneuvers
for training purposes; requiring a training flight after 10 days of inactivity during fire season; and, discussing past
accidents and incidents with pilots, and how they could have been avoided.
Initial assessments of the effectiveness of these adopted recommendations follow. More formal briefings
are not yet widespread, so their effectiveness is still to be determined. Cockpit videos of drops over varied terrain
have anecdotally helped newer pilots “get the proper picture.” The 2010 fire season was also fairly slow, so training
flights about every 10 days seemed to help with pilot proficiency, according to anecdotes from pilots and from aerial
supervisors. Discussions with pilots about past accidents and incidents also seemed to help pilots reflect upon what
they would have done differently in similar circumstances, according to the recently retired SEAT program manager
(fifth author). These discussions covered pilot stressors, such as extended time away from home and financial
pressures to fly in marginal conditions. These stressors seemed to play a minor role, according to those pilots
familiar with the accident or incident pilot, although simple awareness of such stressors may have a beneficial
mitigating effect.
The work reported herein was accomplished in 2009. Subsequently, the 2010 firefighting season was one
of the safest for the SEAT program. While this improvement is due to the hard work of many stakeholders, we are
proud to have played even a small part in such an outcome. Time will tell if such improvements can be sustained.
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